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KOOKY COLLECTS: HOW THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY GRANTS
INHERITANCE RIGHTS TO CALIFORNIA'S
MENTALLY ILL SLAYERS
Laurel Sevier*

I.

INTRODUCTION

If A, a legatee under B's will, murders B, A is barred from
inheriting from B. 1 This is because California law requires
that A forfeit his inheritance rights, not as punishment for
his crime, but on the theory that B would want A disinherited
because A killed her.2 This scenario demonstrates the
concept of the "slayer rule," the civil law consequence that a
killer's wrongful act has on his inheritance rights.3
Slayer rules bar murderers who stand to inherit from
their victim's estate from receiving economic benefits as a
result of the death of their victims.4 When the killer is
insane, however, the rules change. This is because most
slayer rules lack express provisions guiding courts toward the
proper course of action.5 For example, the California slayer
statute does not expressly address the issue of insanity.6
Thus, California is one of many jurisdictions where the
judiciary must make a determination that the legislature

* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., Sociology, University of California,
Berkeley. Special thanks to my family and Seth for their love and support.
1. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 803, 861 (1993).
2. Id.
3. The slayer doctrine states that neither a person who kills another nor
the killer's heirs can share in the decedent's estate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1422 (8th ed. 2004).
4. See discussion infra Part II.A.
5. See discussion infra Part II.F.
6. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2006).
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should have made.7 When presented with a case involving an
insane slayer, the majority of jurisdictions' do not deny
Similarly, California courts have
succession rights. 9
concluded that the mentally ill slayer presents a narrow
exception to the slayer rules, and thus is not barred from
receiving his inheritance.' 1
This comment examines how California's slayer statute
applies to the insane slayer." It will first outline the law in
this area by discussing the development of inheritance laws
and the slayer rule. 12 Next, it will explore the basic principles
and policies underlying the rule. 3 This comment will then
summarize the insanity defense, examine how this complex
legal concept affects judicial treatment of a murdering heir,4
and analyze the complexities of the issue in California.
Finally, this comment proposes that the California
Legislature resolve the ambiguous legal treatment of insane
killers by adding an insanity element to its current slayer
statutes.15

II. THE HISTORY OF RULES REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF PROPERTY WHEN NORMAL TRANSFERS ARE INTERRUPTED
BY MURDER
Passing property by a last will and testament is a

7. See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing judicial development of the insanity
defense in California).
8. For example, though Alabama does not specifically address the issue of
insanity in its inheritance laws, its Supreme Court stated: "We think that the
principle of sound public policy which demands that a sane, felonious killer
should not profit by his crime should be applied as often as and wherever any
claim is made by such killer, whether under contract, will or statute." Weaver
v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 59, 22 So. 2d 525, 527 (1945) (quoting DeZotell v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 60 S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58, 65 (1932) (emphasis added). For more
examples, see also Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803 (1987), Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West Supp. 1991), Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
110-112, paras. 2-6 (Supp. 1991), Missouri, Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 119 S.W.2d 810
(1938), New Hampshire, Kelley v. State, 196 A.2d 68 (1963) (citing Anderson v.
Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956)), New Jersey, N.J. STAT ANN. § 3B:7-1 (West
1983), and North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -10 (1984).
9. See infra Part II.F.
10. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893-94 (Ct. App. 1979).
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
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principle dating back centuries in our legal history. 6
Included in this practice are the common law and statutory
provisions called "slayer rules," which block killers from
inheriting from their victims. 7
A.

The History of Inheritance
The history of wills and the right of testation in AngloAmerican law date back to the eleventh century.' After the
Norman Conquest, England instituted primogeniture. 19 This
legal principle recognized the right of the eldest son to inherit
the family estate, and excluded all female and junior male
descendents with equal degrees of relationship from
inheriting.2" Eventually, with the decline of feudalism, this
archaic system of inheritance ended. 2 ' By the thirteenth
century, leaseholds, the common form of holding property,
were passed by will.22
Two significant legal acts in English law led to the
standardization of the legal written will as the primary
postmortem method of distributing real and personal
property.28 The adoption of the Statute of Wills in 1540
enabled heirs to avoid primogeniture by passing land entirely

16. Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacityand Undue Influence in
the Elderly: A JurisprudentTherapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 71,

73 (2004).
17. Sherman, supra note 1, at 805. The right of inheritance probably arose
from a plain and simple principle where a man's children or nearest relations
would surround him on his deathbed, and be the first witnesses of his death.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1-

2 (6th ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 2000). They become, therefore, the next
immediate occupants of his estate. Id. at 2. Eventually this occurred so
frequently that it developed into general law. Id. While property ownership
continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown. Id. When the
property became inheritable, the inheritance was indefeasible, and the children
or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will. Id. Eventually, society
realized that such a strict rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient, defrauded
creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident fathers from
dividing or charging their estates as the needs of their families required. Id.
The movement away from a rigid inheritance scheme introduced, generally, the
right of disposing of one's property, or a part of it, by a last will and testament.
Id.
18. Marson et al., supra, note 16, at 73.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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by will.24 Subsequently, the Statute of Frauds, enacted in
1677, required "a writing to pass personalty at death."2" In
time, these social and legal developments made the will an
established part of Anglo-American law.26
The system of inheritance rights for murdering heirs is a
less developed aspect of the inheritance system simply
because ancient laws barred them from inheriting. When an
heir murdered a testator under ancient law, the property
transfer system was not complicated; 27 the doctrines of
attainder2" and corruption of blood2 9 immediately settled the
disposition of property by preventing the murderer or his
family from inheriting. ° Perhaps reflecting a desire to leave
behind a darker side of our colonial heritage,3 ' the drafters of
the United States Constitution prevented attainder from
being incorporated into our legal system. 2
Rules regulating slayers codify the common law maxim
ex turpis causa non actio, that no one should profit from their
own wrongful acts. 3 Under the common law, the killer was

24. Marson et al., supra, note 16, at 73.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 74.
27. See John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing
Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 716 n.4 (1936) (citing
Wall v. Pianschmidt, 245 N.W. 58, 59 (1932)) ("The problem did not arise under
the common law until comparatively recent times, 'because of the ancient
common law doctrine of attainder and corruption of blood'").
28. "Attainder," at common law, is the act of extinguishing a person's civil
rights when that person is sentenced to death or declared an outlaw for
committing a felony or treason. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (8th ed. 2004).
29. Corruption of blood was part of an ancient English penalty for treason.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting TERMES DE LA LEY
125 (1st Am. ed. 1812)). It was usually part of a Bill of Attainder, which
normally sentenced the accused to death. Id. at 176. The corruption of blood
forbade the accused's family from inheriting his property. Id. at 371. Such bills
and punishments were often inflicted upon Tories by colonial governments
during the American Revolution. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442
(1965).
30. Wade, supra note 27, at 716.
31. Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Homicide as Precluding Taking Under
Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R. 4th 787, § 2(a) (2005).
32. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The constitutions of each and every state also expressly forbid
bills of attainder. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be
passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.").
33. See Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 399-400 app. A (Md. 1986), for a list of
Slayer's Statutes.
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thus viewed as an "unworthy heir" and his dishonorable act
extinguished his inheritance rights. 4
The Supreme Court first addressed the problem of the
murdering heir in 1886 with New York Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Armstrong.
In New York Mutual, the assignee of a
life insurance policy murdered the insured. 36 The Court held
that "[i]t would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the
country, if one could recover insurance money payable on the
death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken."3 7 In
following the Supreme Court's lead, state courts, beginning
with Riggs v. Palmer8 in New York in 1889, began adopting
the following rule: "[No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found
any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his
own crime."39
Despite state court decisions barring the inheritance of a
murdering heir, some states function without express
references to slayers in their statutes of wills or their statutes
of descent and distribution.4 0 The significant number of
interfamily murders, however, demonstrates the need for
such legislation. In 2002, one in five persons murdered were
killed by a family member.4 ' Every day, four women die as
victims of domestic violence.4 2 Fifty-seven percent of murders
34. Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights:
California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse But Fails to
Build an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 560 (2001).
35. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886); see also
Korpus, supra note 34, at 560.
36. New York Mut. Life, 117 U.S. at 600.
37. Id.

38. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). In this case, the testator's
grandson murdered the testator in order to accelerate his inheritance and
prevent the testator's planned revocation of the provision in his favor. Id.; see
also Julie J. Olenn, Comment, 'Til Death Do Us Part: New York's Slayer Rule
and In Re Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2001).
39. Korpus, supra note 34, at 560-61.
40. Walsh, supra note 31, § 2(a).
41. See generally MATri-IEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FAMILY VIOLENCE

STATISTICS

INCLUDING

STATISTICS

ON STRANGERS AND

ACQUAINTANCES
(2005),
available
at
httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
Family violence accounted for
eleven percent of all reported and unreported violence between 1998 and 2002.
Id. at 1. Of these offenses against family members, forty-nine percent were a
crime against a spouse, eleven percent were a parent attacking a child, and
forty-one percent were an offense against another family member. Id.
42. National Organization for Women, Violence Against Women in the
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of children under the age of twelve are perpetrated by the
victim's parent.4 3 A growing number of jurisdictions have
attempted to avoid the traditional approaches taken by the
courts 44 in an attempt to establish uniformity.45 These states
enacted statutes that expressly preclude certain classes of
slayers from taking under the wills of their victims or
inheriting under the statutes of descent and distribution.4 6
The majority of states follow a statutory scheme similar to
the Uniform Probate Code's slayer rule, which states that
"[an individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the
decedent forfeits all benefits ... with respect to the decedent's
estate," and "[i]f the decedent died intestate, the decedent's
intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his [or her]
intestate share."4 7
(last visited
United States, httpJ/www.now.org/issues/violence/stats.html
February 21, 2007).
43. JOHN M. DAWSON & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: MURDER IN FAMILIES 1

(1994), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mf.pdf.
44. Some courts have permitted the slayer to benefit from his crime on the
theory that the courts are powerless to "amend" the legislature's intent by
judicial enlargement. See Wade, supra note 27, at 717. Other courts bar the
slayer by equitable principles under the maxim that no one should be permitted
to profit from his own wrong. Id. Finally, a third group scorns the first two
solutions. Id. Their solution permits the slayer to take initially under the will
of the victim or pursuant to the statutes of descent and distribution, but
prevents the slayer from using or enjoying the property so acquired. Id. A
constructive trust results in favor of the victim's other lawful heirs, for whom
the slayer holds the property as trustee. Id.
45. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 846 n.207, for a list of state slayer
statutes.
46. Walsh, supra note 31, § 2(a); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803
(2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 966 (2006).

47. Kent S. Berk, Comment, Mercy Killing and the Slayer Rule: Should the
Legislatures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 493 (1992); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b). Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803, with ALA.
CODE § 43-8-253 (Lexis Nexis 1982), and ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.305 (1985 &
Supp. 1991) (repealed 1996), and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (1975 &
Supp. 1991), and CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (Deering 1991), and COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-803 (1987), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West Supp. 1991), and GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-4-6(a) (West 1982) (repealed 1998), and HAW. REV. STAT. §
560:2-803 (1985 & Supp. 1990), and IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803 (1979), and
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 110-112, paras. 2-6 (Supp. 1991), and IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.535 (West Supp. 1991), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2-803
(1964), and MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 27.5251 (West 1978) (repealed 1979), and
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West Supp. 1992), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2104 (1991), and NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (1989), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:7-1
(West 1983), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (West 1989), and N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 31A-3 to -10 (1984), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1976), and OR. REV.
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While the slayer rules of different states find unity in
their use of similar themes, such as principles of equity,
morality, rational property transfer, and public policy
considerations of deterrence, they vary significantly in other
aspects. 48 The types of murderers that states regulate are not
the same in every state. South Carolina, for example, allows
unintentional killers to inherit, while Kansas has a provision
for one who kills their spouse and then commits suicide.4 9
The transfer of property further illustrates how slayer
rules differ among the states in other aspects.
Slayer
statutes resembling the Uniform Probate Code provide for the
transfer of the murdered decedent's estate in one of three
ways.5 ° One way is to treat the portion of the estate originally
left to the slayer as previously nullified by the decedent.5 1
Another way is to create a fictitious transfer treating the
benefiting slayer as if he died before the victim. 52 The final
way is to address the transfer as though the murdering
beneficiary forfeited his share. 3
Regardless of how each state distributes the murderer's
share, the slayer rule must account for all forms of
inheritance. 4 Furthermore, regardless of whether the slayer
would have inherited by will, intestacy, dower, survivorship,
or life insurance, the underlying principle of the slayer rules,
that no one shall profit from their wrongful acts, remains the
same. 5 In order to uphold this principle in each type of
property transfer, slayer statutes must be far-reaching in
their breadth.56 The application of the slayer statute cannot
be limited to, or by, the particular kinds of testamentary

STAT. §§ 112.455 to .555 (1989), and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1.1-1 to -11 (1984),
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (1987), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29-9-1 to -4

(1984) (repealed 2004), and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.01 (West 1991).
48. See supra note 47 (listing a number of relevant state statutes).
49. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2005).
50. Callie Kramer, Note, Guilty by Association: Inadequaciesin the Uniform
ProbateCode Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 697, 704 (2003).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Kramer, supra note 50, at 704. For a discussion of the principle "that no
man shall profit from his own wrong," see Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E. 2d 699, 703
(Ill. 1955).
56. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 847.
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transfers enumerated in it.5 7

B. Specific CaliforniaCodes Addressing the Unworthy Heir
Currently, California Probate Code Section 250 reads
that:
A person who feloniously and intentionally kills the
decedent is not entitled to . . . any property, interest, or

benefit under a will of the decedent, or a trust created by
or for the benefit of the decedent[, . .. [a]ny property of
the decedent by intestate succession . . . [or] [any of the

decedent's quasi-community property ....
Originally, section 1409 of the Civil Code composed the
California slayer statute.59 The legislature enacted this
section in response to public outrage over a single event-a
California youth murdered his entire family so he could
succeed to their property.60 The public reacted strongly and
harshly criticized "a system of law which would permit such
injustice."6 ' Section 1409 addressed this matter by providing
that "[n] o person who has been convicted of the murder of the
decedent shall be entitled to succeed to any portion of his
."62 As issues arose over the years, the code was
estate ..
amended to accommodate changing public needs. 63
C. Principlesand Policies Supporting the Unworthy Heir
Rules
Principles of equity, morality, property law and
deterrence support the slayer rule.' In equity, preventing a
criminal from profiting from his crime serves a greater

57. Id.
58. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2006).

59. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1979).
60. Id.; see also People v. Weber, 86 P. 671 (1906). The devolution of the
property was not contested, at least in the appellate courts, and the property
was used to pay the attorneys who unsuccessfully defended the murderer in the
criminal trial. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The Legislature broadened the statute in 1955 to terminate the
inheritance rights of claimants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Id. In
1963, the Legislature made several more changes to the code. Id. The
amendments were designed to accommodate murder-suicide cases, and to
prevent litigation regarding issues previously decided in criminal proceedings in
probate proceedings. Id.
64. Kramer, supra note 50, at 700.
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societal interest than that which would be served by allowing
the preservation of legal rights of ownership. 65 A colorful
66
example of equity in action is Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co.
In this case, a stepson killed his stepmother so that he could
inherit her wealth and use it to persuade a woman to marry
him.6
The court ruled that the stepson could not inherit
because it would be contrary to public policy to allow him to
benefit from his act of greed.68
When a killing is motivated by greed, morality clearly
justifies denying the slayer the right to take from his or her
victim's estate. 69 However, the moral principles remain
applicable even when the killer was not motivated by
economic gain. 70 For example, after drinking and arguing, a
wife shot and killed her husband. 7' Despite the fact that
alcohol and conflict motivated the killer, and
not greed, the
72
court could not justify allowing her to inherit.
Additional principles support the slayer rule. Slayers
interrupt the regular disposition of property 73 and interfere
with the concept of "free and unencumbered transfer of one's
property."74 There is also a deterrence element. By denying a
slayer the benefits flowing from his act, potential killers may
be less inclined to act.75
D. The Slayer Rules Applied
States generally restrict the application of slayer rules to
cases in which the killing is felonious and intentional.7 6
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co., 232 N.W. 239 (Mich. 1930).
Kramer, supra note 50, at 700.
Id.
Id. at 701.

70. Id.
71. Leavy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 581 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
72. Id. at 171.
73. The victim's death causes her to lose the enjoyment of her personal
property, and in some cases, victims are denied an opportunity to revise their
existing estate plans. Kramer, supra note 50, at 701-02. The order of death of
the victims and slayers is interrupted, placing property transfers conditioned on
survivorship in jeopardy of being controlled by surviving slayers. Id.
74. Id. at 702.
75. Id.
76. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) describes the wrongful killing as
felonious and intentional. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (1982). Other
statutes use similar language. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.802 (2006) ("unlawful
and intentional"); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.455 (2006) ("with felonious intent").
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Courts require proof by a preponderance of the evidence 77
that the slayer feloniously killed the decedent.78 Conversely,
courts generally do not deny an individual the right to
succeed to his victim's property where less heinous conduct is
involved.7 ' However, not all aspects of the slayer statutes are
interpreted as uniformly as others.
Standards for "conviction" take on many forms and
interpretations. 0
A significant minority of state slayer
statutes bar a slayer from inheriting from the victim if the
slayer is convicted of criminal homicide, regardless of how the
term "conviction" is defined or restricted.8 1 A final judgment
of conviction is conclusive evidence of a felonious and
intentional killing in California. 2 The California Court of
Appeals, however, held that the absence of a conviction will
not prevent the court from determining that a killing was
felonious and intentional when determining succession
83
rights.

While the circumstances of a felonious and intentional killing vary, three
categories of possible factual circumstances that surround the killings may be
identified to find the moral and legal reasons for denying slayers the right to
succeed to their victim's property: (1) a killing for greed; (2) a killing that is not
economically motivated; and (3) a killing following a suicide that involves a
slayer's distributes. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter
of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491 (1986).

77. A lower, or civil, standard of evidence is used because probate law is
concerned with preventing a killer from profiting from his wrong, whereas
criminal law aims to protect the accused. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 17, at 146.
78. Sherman, supra note 1, at 853. Section 2-803(e) of the Uniform Probate
Code adopts this standard, and it has been the model for a number of slayer
statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-253(e) (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.251(5) (West 1979), (repealed 2002); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803(f) (West
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-804(5) (1978); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.802
(1983) ("by the greater weight of the evidence").
79. Fellows, supra note 76, at 496-97; see also In re Wolf, 150 N.Y.S. 738,
742-43 (Sur. Ct. 1914) (husband who killed wife when attempting to kill her
lover and was convicted of manslaughter could inherit because he did not intend
to kill wife); In re Estate of Klein, 378 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Pa. 1977) (husband
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for wife's death could take under wife's
estate because slayer statute required "willful" as well as unlawful killing).
80. Sherman, supra note 1, at 853-56.
81. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (LexisNexis 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
381.280 (LexisNexis 1920); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (West 1990); see also
Sherman, supra note 1, at 854.
82. Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 293 (Ct. App. 1995)
(construing CAL. PROB. CODE § 254(b) (West 2006)).
83. Id.

20071

KOOKY COLLECTS

389

When faced with slayer statutes containing express
conviction requirements, many courts choose to interpret the
statutes as "supplementing rather than superseding" the
common law slayer rule.'
The result is that even those
slayers who are not convicted are barred from inheriting."6
Very few courts view the conviction element as a legislative
demand, and therefore, most do not require a conviction as a
prerequisite for operation of the statute.8 6
The slayer rules may prevent a killer who was never
convicted from inheriting from his victims even in states that
do not have an explicit conviction requirement.
For
example, in some jurisdictions, slayer rules are invoked even
if the slayer commits suicide before being criminally
charged. 8 As a result, the victim's property will pass to the
victim's heirs or alternate legatees instead of the heirs or
legatees of the slayer.8 9 However, if the slayer is acquitted in
a criminal proceeding but found guilty in a civil trial, slayer
rules may still bar his inheritance.
Evidently, although a particular jurisdiction may have a
slayer statute, that statute is not always conclusive of how
courts will rule.
Many intricate details factor into
interpreting a slayer statute. When the slayer is insane, for
example, the analysis becomes even more complex.

84. Sherman, supra note 1, at 855; see also Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P.2d
514 (Colo. 1950); Nat'l City Bank v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 715 (Ind. 1957),
overruling Bruns v. Cope, 105 N.E. 471 (Ind. 1914); Jones v. All Am. Life Ins.
Co., 325 S.E.2d 237, 244 (N.C. 1985); Parker v. Potter, 157 S.E. 68, 70-71 (N.C.
1931); Shrader v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 485 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio
1985).
85. Sherman, supra note 1, at 855.
86. Id.; see also, e.g., Peeples v. Corbett, 157 So. 510, 512 (Fla. 1934); In re
Estate of Buehnemann, 324 N.E.2d 97, 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Hogg v.
Whitham, 242 P. 1021, 1022 (Kan. 1926); Holliday v. McMullen, 756 P.2d 1179,
1180 (Nev. 1988).
87. Sherman, supra note 1, at 855.
88. See Nat'l City Bank, 144 N.E.2d at 715.
89. See id.
90. Sherman, supra note 1, at 854. This is a result of the different burdens

of proof required by the criminal and civil proceedings (it may be possible to
prove the slaying by a preponderance of the evidence but not beyond a
reasonable doubt) as well as the principles of res judicata and due process. Id.
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The Insanity Defense

1. History of the Insanity Defense
The maxim that "[o]ur collective conscience does not
allow punishment where it cannot impose blame"91 is deeply
rooted in Anglo-Saxon law.9 2 The earliest case in which a jury
acquitted an alleged murderer on insanity grounds occurred
in 1505, though it is unclear when this became a regular
practice.9 3
The English law relating to the criminal responsibility of
the insane did not change substantially until 1800, when it
changed dramatically. 94
In that year, James Hadfield
attempted to assassinate King George III. 91 Hadfield was
deluded. He thought he was the savior of all humankind that
and assassinating the King was the clearest path to
martyrdom.9 6 In defending against a high treason charge,
Hadfield theorized that a man could know right from wrong,
understand the nature of the act he was about to commit, and
even reveal a clear design in planning and executing his act.97
If his mental state was responsible for the act, however, then
legally, he should not be held accountable.98
As a result of Hadfield's actions, the English Parliament
quickly passed the Criminal Lunatics Act. 99 The act set forth
a two-part procedure for proper treatment of an allegedly
insane offender. 10 0 First, the verdict for one adjudged insane
was the newly codified special verdict of "not guilty by reason
of insanity."' 01 Second, when this verdict was rendered, the
10 2
act provided for the offender's automatic commitment.
91. Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity
Defense, 31 EMoRY L.J. 9, 9 (1982) (citing Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954)).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 11. The earliest case resolved on the grounds of insanity can be
found in the Yearbooks of Henry VIII, 21 Michaelmas Term, plea 16 (1505). Id.
at 11 n.5.
94. Id. at 12 n.11 (citing J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 88 (1955)).
95. Id. (citing J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 89 (1955)).
96. Id.
97. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 91, at 12 n.11.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id. at 14.
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Even before Hadfield's assassination attempt, the
insanity defense had begun its slow evolution from "not guilty
by reason of insanity" to "guilty but insane." °3
In the
eighteenth century, the increase of recognized capital offenses
had a profound effect on the evolution of the defense.0 4 The
defense was increasingly used and grew more formalized in
England and the United States. 0 5 Acknowledging that it was
beneficial to "alleviate the harshness of sentencing to death
one who could not be said to possess the requisite criminal
intent," courts expanded the idea of legal insanity.0 6 The
courts established procedures for the insane defendant0 7
08
which afforded greater protection.
Eventually, the verdict evolved into a judgment of "not
guilty by reason of insanity."109
American lawmakers
disregarded the public's outcry for reform of the defense in
the early 1900's, and refused to follow England in changing
the defense to "guilty but insane."" 0 However, in 1982,
lawmakers finally changed the defense in response to the
acquittal of John Hinckley Jr."'
Hinckley attempted to
assassinate President Ronald Reagan, but was acquitted by
reason of insanity."1 2 This event had a dramatic impact on
insanity defense jurisprudence." 3
In response to public

103. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 91, at 14. Queen Victoria was
unhappy that a defendant like Hadfield could be "not guilty by reason of
insanity." Id. She considered Hadfield guilty of treason regardless of the
language of the jury verdict. Id. Eventually, the Queen's concern for semantics
prevailed, and Parliament passed the Trial of Lunatics Act of 1883, changing
the permissible verdict from "not guilty by reason of insanity" to "guilty but
insane." Id.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id. at 12-13.
106. Id. at 13.
107. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 591

(2dEd. 1999).
108. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 91, at 13. Prior to this time, the
insane were not punished for several reasons: the prosecution may have failed
to prove its case, courts and juries were sympathetic to their plights, or they
were subsequently pardoned by the King. Id.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id. at 14-15.
111. Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing
the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic
Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 735-36 (2003).
112. Id. at 735.
113. Id.
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outrage over the acquittal,11 4 Congress enacted the 1984
Insanity Defense Reform Act, which weakened the test for
insanity used at the time, 115 and aligned it more closely with
England's M'Naghten rule." 6 To establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, the M'Naghten rule requires that at the
time the act was committed, the defendant was "labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind," such
that he did not realize "the nature and quality" of his actions;
if the defendant did realize "the nature and quality" of his
actions, the rule requires that he did not know it was
17
wrong. 1

2. Development of the CaliforniaInsanity Defense
California has, with slight variation, followed the
M'Naghten test for legal insanity since the early nineteenth
century.1 ' At the turn of the century, the California Supreme
Court rejected efforts to expand the rule to include "moral
"11920
impulse." 20 In 1927, however, the
insanity " "' or "irresistible

114. A strong contingency in American politics is still pushing for reform;
some even call for the complete abolition of the defense. GEORGE J. ALEXANDER
& ALAN W. SCHEFLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISORDER 752 (Carolina Academic
Press 1998).
The abolition of the insanity defense, however, might be
unconstitutional. Id. at 754 (citing State v. Hoffmhan, 328 N.W.2d 709, 714-15
(Minn. 1982) (holding that a defendant has a due process constitutional right to
assert an insanity defense)). While the United States Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue, it has been adjudicated with differing results in
state courts. Id.
115. Manchester, supra note 111, at 736. The test used in 1984 was the
American Law Institute two-prong test. Id. See infra note 124 for a discussion
of the American Law Institute test.
116. Id. In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten was indicted for shooting Edward
Drummon, secretary to the Prime Minister of England. ALEXANDER &
SCHEFLIN, supra note 114, at 744. The jury returned a not guilty by reason of
insanity verdict which became the subject of popular alarm. Id. Queen Victoria
was particularly concerned. Id. As a result, the House of Lords asked the
judges to give an advisory opinion regarding the law governing such cases. Id.
Their combined answers have come to be known as M'Naghten's Rules. Id.
117. ALEXANDER & SCHEFLIN, supra note 114, at 745.
118. Haaris Syed, Developments in CaliforniaHomicide Law, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1371, 1374 (2003).
119. Moral insanity can best be defined as perversion of the moral senses.
See People v. Kerrigan, 14 P. 849, 851 (Cal. 1887).
120. Walter L. Gordon, III, Old Wine in Old Bottles: California Mental
Defenses at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 75, 78 (2003); see
also People v. Hubert, 51 P. 329, 331 (Cal. 1897) ("[Clonceding that the act was
the offspring of irresistible impulse, and the impulse was irresistible because of
mental disease, still the defendant must be held responsible if he at the time
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Legislature made a major revision of the insanity defense by
bifurcating the trials of insanity cases. 2 ' In this revision, the
Legislature intended to remove all evidence of122the defendant's
mental state from the guilt phase of the trial.
Although judicial interpretation refined the defense over
the years, it did not significantly change until 1978.123 In that
year, the California Supreme Court adopted the American
Law Institute test (ALI test)124 for insanity. 2 5 In explaining
its decision, the court stated that the "exclusive focus upon
the cognitive capacity of the defendant [was] an outgrowth of
the then current psychological theory under which the mind
was divided into separate independent compartments, one of
which could be diseased without affecting the others." 2 6 The
court noted that although it had tried to modify M'Naghten
by requiring that the defendant appreciate or understand the
wrongfulness of his act, as well as by developing the defense
of diminished capacity, these changes did not solve all the
problems. 127 The primary failure with the modified version of
M'Naghten was that it "still ... [fell] short of acknowledging
the teaching of psychiatry that mental aberration may not
only impair knowledge of wrongfulness but may very well
destroy an individual's capacity to control or to restrain

had the requisite knowledge as to the nature and quality of the act, and of its
wrongfulness.").
121. Gordon, supra note 120, at 79. The new law was the product of the
California Commission for the Reform of Criminal Procedure (Commission),
created by the Legislature in 1925 to provide the state with the most efficient
system for swift justice. Id. at 80. The Commission was particularly concerned
with abuse of the insanity defense in criminal trials. Id. The change created a
new plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity," and provided that if both the plea
of "not guilty," and "not guilty by reason of insanity" were entered, the plea of
"not guilty" was tried first with a presumption that the defendant was sane. Id.
If the person was convicted, then the same jury, or another, would try the issue
of insanity. Id.
122. Id. However, neither the Commission nor the Legislature addressed the
issue of whether mental state evidence was admissible on the issue of intent in
crimes, like homicide, that required a specific mental state. Id. at 80-81.
123. See id. at 87.
124. The ALI test, or "substantial capacity test," states: "[A] person is not
criminally responsible for an act if, as a result of mental disease or defect, the
person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the
conduct or to conform the conduct to the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1469
(8th ed. 2004).
125. People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Cal. 1978).
126. Id. at 1322.
127. Id. at 1323.
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himself."2 '
In light of this judicial decision, the defense soon received
attention from the California Legislature.'2 9
In 1981,
following the slayings of two popular San Francisco
politicians and the successful use of the diminished capacity
defense by their murderer, 130 the California Legislature
passed a bill that eliminated the diminished capacity defense
and forbade expert testimony on whether the defendant had
the requisite mental state for the crime. 131 In June of 1982,
the defense changed again when voters passed Proposition
8.132 Proposition 8 abolished the diminished capacity defense,
and reinstated the M'Naghten test of insanity. 1 33 Currently,
the Penal Code states that by law, the defendant is insane if
he is "incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and
quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right
from
" 134
offense.
the
of
commission
the
of
time
the
at
wrong
3. Theories of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence
The development of insanity defense jurisprudence is
"the outcome of a fairly uneasy detente between law and
psychiatry."1 35 The insanity defense is one aspect of a series
of tensions between the field of psychiatry and the legal
system. 136 "It symbolizes the gap between the aspirations of a
theoretically positivist and objective common law legal
system . . . and the reality of an indeterminate, subjective,
psychosocial universe (in which behavior is determined by a
host of biological, psychological, physiological, environmental
and sociological factors, and is frequently driven by
unconscious forces)." 37
The law is ambivalent about punishing the mentally

128. Id.
129. Gordon, supra note 120, at 89.
130. People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1981).

131. S. 54, 1981 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1981).
132. Proposition 8 enacted Article I, Section 28 of the California Constitution.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
133. Gordon, supra note 120, at 90.
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 2006).
135. Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of

Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 611 (1990).
136. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
187 (1994).

137. Perlin, supra note 135, at 619-20.
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disabled.1 3 Society is apprehensive of being too exculpatory
by allowing behavioral explanations for crimes, and is still
trying to evolve from the medieval punitive spirit. 139 Still, the
social order yearns for an assured method of identifying
mentally disabled individuals so that their exculpation will
not illustrate a weakness in the law. 40 The slayer statutes
illustrate the mixed feelings society has in punishing the
insane while maintaining social order.
F. Slayer Statutes and the Insanity Defense
Without explicit statutory rules as guidance, the majority
of courts will not disinherit a slayer if he is insane. 4 1 The
courts that have addressed the issue have held, for a variety
of reasons and based upon various tests for criminal insanity,
that a person who is not responsible for his criminal act at the
time of its commission is not subject to the application of a
slayer statute or rule. 42 Thus, the killer's
criminal conduct
43
does not preclude him from enrichment.
Each jurisdiction's insanity test influences courts'
determination of whether the insane should inherit."4 For
example, some courts, especially those that apply the
M'Naghten definition of insanity, conclude that, under the
test, a person found to be insane should be acquitted of the
criminal charge. 45 Since he was not "guilty" of committing

138. PERLIN, supra note 136 at 187.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Walsh, supra note 31, § 2(a).
142. See Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 399 (Md. 1986).
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id. In Eisenhardt v. Siegel, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed
the issue of sanity in a title dispute. 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938). One brother, who
was insane at the time of the homicide, shot and killed his brother. See id. at
811. This triggered a reversion of title in certain property. Id. The fact of the
"murder" did not preclude the reversion for the reason that the slayer was
insane. See id. at 812. The defense of insanity, per M'Naghten, eradicated the
murder; in other words, since the slayer was insane, there was no murder. Id.
("Plaintiffs had no case, except on the issue of murder, and there was no murder
if John was insane ....).
New Jersey applies the M'Naghten test in determining an accused's sanity. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (1982). New York applies a somewhat modified
version of M'Naghten. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2004). The
Pennsylvania and Texas insanity statutes apply the M'Naghten test. See 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315(b) (West 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon
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146
the homicide, the slayer rule is not invoked.
A number of other courts reason that an insane killer
could not entertain the requisite intent to make his act
criminal.' 4 7 Therefore, the homicide could not have been
intentional, unlawful, or felonious, thereby rendering the
slayer statute inapplicable.'4 8 In some states, the slayer rule
speaks in terms of a "conviction" and the insanity statute
permits a verdict of guilty, but precludes the imposition of
punishment. 1 49 Courts in these states have concluded that
since no criminal sentence will be entered upon a guilty
verdict, the killer does not stand convicted.' 50 Finally, one
Illinois appellate court' 5 ' simply used the "humane rule that
an insane killer is not a murderer" as prevailing over the
tenet that we should not allow an offender to profit from an
intentional wrong. 152
In sum, the cases addressing this issue share the belief
that permitting the insane killer to share in the distribution
of the victim's assets is consistent with the common law
principle of equity, the principle from which the slayer rule
originates. 5 3
Courts feel that "the present enlighted
definition of criminal insanity under which punishment for
the commission of a crime is prohibited ... make the maxims
prompting the rule . . . inappropriate when a person is
criminally insane. "
This is consistent with Justice
Cardozo's analysis of the Riggs opinion: 55 "[T]he logic of this
[equitable] principle prevailed over the logic of others ....
One path was followed, another closed, because of the

2006).

146. Ford, 512 A.2d at 399.
147. Id.

148. See id.
149. Id.

For example, in Pouncey v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals

said: "No criminal sentence may ever be entered on the guilty verdict in this
case [where the second verdict was 'insane'] and the [slayer], therefore, does not
stand 'convicted' of the murder offense in the traditional sense of the criminal
law." 465 A.2d 475, 478 (Md. 1983).
150. Ford, 512 A.2d at 399.
151. See Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
152. Ford, 512 A.2d at 399.
153. Id.; see also Fellows, supra note 76 (arguing that a more preferable
statutory rule is one that focuses on the preservation of the property transfer
system in light of the killing, rather than on the specific types of property
interests that ought to be denied the slayer as a matter of equity).
154. Ford, 512 A.2d at 398.
155. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
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conviction in the judicial mind that the one selected led to
justice."156
The controlling California case in this area of law is
Estate of Ladd.15 7 This case demonstrates the proposition of a
slayer adjudged insane and therefore never "convicted" of
slaying, but still allowed to take under his victim's will. 158 In
Estate of Ladd, the court considered whether a mother, Gloria
Ladd, could succeed to the estates of her murdered teenage
sons. 15 9 Her motivation for killing them was that she was
considering committing suicide, and "didn't want them upset
by being homeless orphans and other trauma that goes with
suicide." 60
The court held that an insane person is incapable of
committing a crime, and therefore is not capable of acting
unlawfully for purposes of California Probate Code section
258.161

Ladd was found guilty of murdering her sons, but

insane at the time of the murders. 162 The children's paternal
uncle claimed that Ladd was disqualified from succeeding to
the estates because she "unlawfully and intentionally" caused
their deaths under the slayer statute. 63 Upon reviewing the
history of the statute, however, the court ruled that Ladd
could inherit from her sons because she was insane at the
time of the murders.' 64
This conclusion is virtually
synonymous with other courts
that have been asked to make
65
a similar determination.

Cases addressing this issue share unanimity in their
67
results, 66 but virtually no uniformity in reaching them.
156. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-41

(photo. reprint 1998) (1921).
157. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1979).
158. See Walsh, supra note 31, § 7.
159. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 893-94.
162. Id. at 895.
163. Id. at 891.
164. Id. at 894.
165. See Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d, 389, 399 (Md. 1986).
166. But see Congleton v. Sansom, 664 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
Goldsmith v. Pearce, 75 N.W.2d 810 (Mich. 1956); Garner v. Phillips, 47 S.E.2d
845 (N.C. 1948) (in each of these cases, a slayer who was not tried on, or was
acquitted of, charges arising from the slaying on the ground that he was insane
at the time he committed the crime, was nevertheless disqualified from
inheriting from his victim's estate under applicable statutes of descent and
distribution).
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Several examples illustrate this point. 6 ' In Florida, a woman
murdered her husband, but was allowed to take from his
estate. 169 Because she was adjudged insane, she was not
convicted as required by the state slayer statute. 17 0 Also, in
South Dakota, the slayer rule requires that the killer be
"sane" in order for it to apply.' 7' The slayer rule had no
application in Maryland when a woman who was the
beneficiary under her mother's will killed her mother.' 2 The
woman was convicted of murdering her mother in the first
degree, but adjudged not criminally responsible because she
was also insane.'7 3 The varying rationalizations courts use to
pardon the insane slayer demonstrate the complexities of this
issue, as well as the interplay between morality and legal
standards.
III. CALIFORNIA'S SLAYER STATUTE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDER
74
The current California slayer rules are insufficient
because they do not provide for the occurrence of a mentally
ill offender. Instead, they only address and account for broad
issues regarding the differing types of murder. 1 75 It is
disturbing to note that other states have equally deficient
slayer statutes which force courts to use varying methods to
determine how to adjudicate this issue. 176 The different
methodologies courts have employed prove that reforms are
77
needed in this area.
The California slayer statute is especially in need of
First, a provision for
attention from the Legislature. 7 '
insanity is conspicuously absent from the California Probate

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Ford, 512 A.2d at 399.
See Walsh, supra note 31, § 7.
Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla. 1956).
Id.
De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 245 N.W. 58, 65 (S.D. 1932).
Ford, 512 A.2d 389.
Id. at 399.
See discussion infra Part V.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 250-59 (West 2006).
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part II.F.
See discussion infra Part V.
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Code. 179 Second, the seminal appellate case interpreting this
issue is grounded in an outdated insanity defense."' 0 Third,
the California Penal and Probate Codes have been revised
since this decision.18 ' Furthermore, as a reflection of society's
constant evolution, developments in mental health laws
support the necessity of change.' 82 With changes in all other
aspects of the law surrounding this issue, one can only
conclude that formal change is needed here as well.
Without legislative guidance, California courts are free to
reach their own interpretation of the state's slayer rules. 83
This is a clear violation of the law of inheritance, which
ls
should receive guidance and control from the legislature.'
Furthermore, the mentally ill represent a significant part of
society, and the Probate Code's lack of acknowledgement of
their place in society needs to85be addressed and provided for
by the California Legislature.1

IV. ANALYSIS

Although the question of an individual heir's
"worthiness" is typically irrelevant for inheritance purposes,
the slayer rules provide one exception to this general
corollary. 8 6
Under these rules, American jurisdictions
recognize the relevance of a murdering heir, and disqualify
that individual from inheriting.8 7 In application, there is an
exception to this exception when the slayer is insane1i8S
Generally, court decisions allow a slayer who has been found
insane to inherit, 189 but recent decisions by several state
legislatures' 90 indicate that change is imminent. 19'
179. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
180. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
181. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
182. See generally Gordon, supra note 120.
183. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
184. See Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1919); Estate of Gurnsey,
170 P. 402 (Cal. 1918); Estate of Wilmerding, 49 P. 181 (Cal. 1897); Estate of
Scott, 202 P.2d 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
185. See generally Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 91 (discussing the law
and the mentally ill).
186. Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?-The Case of the
"Terminated"Parent,40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006).
187. See id.
188. See generally Walsh, supra note 31, § 7.
189. See supra note 141-43 and accompanying text.
190. The legislatures of Indiana and Ohio have amended their statutes to
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Relieving the insane slayer of responsibility is consistent
with the principles of equity that form the basis of the slayer
rules. 9 2 Because the killer did not have the requisite intent
to kill, which is the very essence of the bar of equity, equity
should not bar the slayer from succession under the statute of

distributions. 193
California allows the insane slayer exception despite a
lack of guidance from the Legislature on the issue. 19 4 This is
problematic because the exception is outdated.'9 5 To begin
with, the decision of whether the slayer statutes should apply
to the insane is a statutory decision, and should be made by
Even without guidance from the
the state legislature. 96
legislature, the current judicial interpretation of the statute
is based on an outdated appellate court decision, Estate of
Ladd.197 Relying on the Estate of Ladd decision is wrong for
two reasons-first, the decision interpreted California's slayer
statute in light of an outdated version of the Penal Code, and
second, California has made several changes to its insanity
defense since the decision. 198
Finally, absent an explicit
provision for the mentally ill, the statutory language does not
provide the legal system adequate guidelines in deciding how
to properly treat the mentally ill.'99
A. The Decision of Whether ProbateCode Section 250 Applies
to Insane Slayers Should Be Made by the Legislature
The rules of probate are regulated by the Legislature. °°
"The laws of inheritance and testamentary disposition are
wholly statutory and subject to legislative control, and do not
depend on the ideas of the courts as to justice and natural
include the insane slayer as falling within the purview of the slayer statutes.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (LexisNexis 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-12-12.1 (LexisNexis 1986).
191. See discussion infra Part V.
192. Kramer, supra note 50, at 713.
193. Id.
194. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
195. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
196. See Estate of Kramme, 573 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Cal. 1978); Estate of Kirby,
121 P. 370, 371 (Cal. 1912).
197. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
198. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 notes (West 2006).
199. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
200. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Estate of
Kramme, 573 P.2d at 1372,-73; Estate of Kirby, 121 P. at 371.
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rights."2 1 However, absent an express provision providing for
the appropriate outcome of an issue, courts are forced to
determine and rule on their approximation of the legislature's
intent.2 °2
In determining how to apply the insanity defense to the
slayer statute, California courts must construe the Probate
Code to comply with their desired outcome.20 3 For example,
the court in Estate of Ladd concluded that, despite the fact
that the trial court found Gloria Ladd guilty, there was no
"conviction" for the purposes of the slayer statute.2 4 If there
had been a "conviction" under the slayer statute, it would
have been conclusive proof of "unlawfulness."2 5 For purposes
of the slayer statute, the court was certain that the
Legislature intended this to be construed as an "acquittal."2 6
However, section 254 of the California Probate Code offers a
different conclusion.2 7 Under this section, a conviction is
conclusive of a "felonious and intentional" killing. 20 8 When no
determination of a criminal conviction is made, the probate
court makes its own determination of whether the killing was
felonious and intentional. 20 9 Although seemingly a mere
matter of semantics, the effect of not having a "conviction"
should be made by the Legislature.
The contradiction
between the Estate of Ladd holding and what the Probate
Code suggests regarding a "conviction" demonstrates the need
for an unambiguous express provision regarding slayers.
B. Estate of Ladd is Socially Outdated and Inconsistent with
the CurrentSlayer Statute
Changes and attitudes about California's insanity
defense, as well as amended language of the slayer statute,
render Estate of Ladd outdated.2 10 In examining the fact

201. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
202. This has led to varied reasonings and applications of the slayer statute.
See discussion supra Part IID.
203. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
204. Id. at 893. Because the trial court deemed Ladd insane at the time of
the killings, she was not "convicted." Id.
205. Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 401 (Md. 1986).
206. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
207. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 254 (West 2006).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 254(b).
210. See infra Parts IV.B.1-2.
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pattern in Estate of Ladd in light of these changes, it is
apparent that the result may have been different if the case
were decided today.2 1 '
1.

The "Feloniouslyand Intentionally"Requirement

When Estate of Ladd was decided, section 258 of the
Probate Code held that in order to be disqualified from
inheritance, a slayer must have acted "unlawfully and
intentionally."2 12 The Estate of Ladd court easily dismissed
the intent requirement by applying section 21 of the
California Penal Code, which stated that insane persons are
not of sound mind and are therefore incapable of acting
intentionally for the purposes of section 258.213 Thus, even if
the slayer acted unlawfully, without satisfaction of the
requirement that the act be intentional, the slayer would still
Presently, the California Penal Code does not
inherit.
contain such explicit language.2 1" Section 21 of the Penal
Code now states that "intention is manifested by the
circumstances connected with the offense."2 15 When the
Estate of Ladd court interpreted the "unlawfully" standard
under the former section 21, it reasoned that insane persons
are incapable of acting "unlawfully," since they are incapable
of being found guilty of committing crimes.2 16 Given the
changes to section 21, a court would likely reach a very
different result than did the Estate of Ladd court.
After Estate of Ladd, the California Legislature amended
the slayer statute to read "feloniously and intentionally,"
The term
instead of "unlawfully and intentionally. "217
"felonious" is subject to several interpretations. 2 8 A narrow
construction of "feloniously" provides that only an act
constituting a felony, as defined by the state criminal
statutes, is felonious. 2 " Thus, under such an interpretation,
211. See Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1979), for a discussion
of the facts in that case. See also supra notes 157-64.
212. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
213. Id. at 894.
214. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 21 (West 2006).
215. Id. However, the notes of decision indicate that this change does not
render a difference when applying "intent" to an insanity defense. Id.
216. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
217. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2006).
218. See Fellows, supra note 76, at 555 n.26.
219. Id. Thus, for example, a killing by a juvenile could not be felonious, and
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the issue would be whether an insane person can commit a
felony.220 Some courts, as in Estate of Ladd, found that a
killing by a person deemed insane cannot be felonious, and
22 1
therefore, the killer would not be precluded from inheriting.
In effect, this construction of "felonious" operates as a greater
protection for the insane than the former interpretation of
"unlawful. 2 2 '
Other courts have broadly construed "felonious" to mean
"without legal excuse or justification."2 2 3 This interpretation
offers a way for the mentally ill to evade the application of the
slayer statute since the very existence of the insanity defense
demonstrates that this condition is, in fact, a "legal excuse" or
"justification" for a criminal act.2 24 If a court found a person
to be insane using this construction of "felonious," a mentally
ill person would not be precluded from inheriting by the
slayer statute.2 2 5
The Florida Supreme Court 226 attempted to clarify the
meaning behind the description "felonious killer[s]."227 The
court stated that an acquittal by reason of insanity
conclusively established that the slayer was not guilty of the
charged offense because, "as a matter of criminal law [hie
lacked the capacity to commit the crime."228 The justices
concluded that this construction is properly applied only in
the context of criminal law and that the record should be
cleared of any confusion caused by "such epithets."2 2 9
Unfortunately, this interpretation provides little in the way of
precedent for California courts to follow.
The varying interpretations of the word "feloniously"
demonstrate that while its usage might not preclude the
insane from inheriting, a conclusive interpretation is better
left to the California Legislature. A definitive rule from the

a juvenile killer could not be precluded from inheriting. Id.
220. See id.
221. Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
222. See Fellows, supra note 76, at 555 n.26.
223. Id.
224. See supra Part II.E for the history of the insanity defense.
225. The slayer would receive his inheritance and be excused from his
wrongful action on account of his insanity. Id.
226. Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956).
227. Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 402 (Md. 1986).
228. Id. at 401 (citing Hill, 85 So. 2d at 851).
229. Ford, 512 A.2d at 401-02.
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Legislature is especially necessary in light of societal changes
and the growing trend of lawmakers declining to provide legal
protection for the mentally ill.2 3°
The comments to California's amended Probate Code
explain that "feloniously" was substituted for "unlawfully" in
Probate Code section 258 because of the felony murder rule.23 1
In effect, the earlier language disqualified a person from
inheriting if the killing was deemed accidental but within the
scope of the felony murder rule.23 2 The new language was
intended to eliminate this disqualification. 23 3 The amended
statute did not address the issue of the insane slayer.2 34 In
fact, the California slayer statute has never contained an
express accommodation for the mentally ill. 23 5 Consequently,
the interpretation of this wording has always been left to the
courts

.236

2. Amendments to the CaliforniaInsanity Defense
The amendments to California's insanity defense in 1982
are a single reflection of society's constantly shifting
perspective on the criminal culpability of the mentally ill.
The Estate of Ladd decision of 1979 is an anomaly, dangling
between the 1978 change to the loose ALI test, and the quick
return in 1982 to the stricter M'Naghten rule.23 7
The M'Naghten rule and the ALI test are considerably
different.2 38 Whereas the ALI test contains both cognitive and
volitional
components,
M'Naghten
is
narrow
and
conservative, and excuses only a cognitive component. 239 The
230. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
231. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2006). The felony murder rule holds that
death resulting from the commission or attempted commission of a felony is
murder. Most states restrict this rule to inherently dangerous felonies.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 651 (8th ed. 2004).

232. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2006).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1979).
236. Id.
237. When California switched from M'Naghten to the ALI test, there were
187 not guilty by reason of insanity acquittals in the year preceding the change,
and 270 in the year following. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical
Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward
Informed Policy, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 375, 380 n.9 (1999).
238. Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity,
10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 1, 12 (2003).
239. Borum & Fulero, supra note 237, at 377.
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ALI test excuses a person from criminal liability if the person
240
could not "appreciate" the criminality of his or her conduct,
rather than if he or she did not "know" it was wrong. "241
Thus, under the ALI test, the defendant's lack of emotional
understanding can be incorporated into his or her defense.242
Additionally, the ALI test requires only that defendants "lack
substantial capacity," as opposed to total capacity, to
appreciate the criminality of their conduct. 243 The ALI test
of "wrongfulness" rather than
also allows 2consideration
"criminality." 44 This word choice enables courts to find the
accused insane if she does not know the act was illegal, or if
she believes the act was "morally justified" according to
community standards.2 4 5
This delicate treatment of the criminal liability of the
mentally ill is reflected in the Estate of Ladd court's decision
to allow Gloria Ladd to inherit from her two sons. Without an
express statutory provision for the insane slayer, California
law relies on this decision, a case determined during ALI
test's four-year stint as the standard for insanity. Ladd's
words indicate that, while she may have known that what she
was doing was wrong, she did not realize that her actions
were criminal. 246 Hence, she passed the ALI test. The court's
statutory analysis concluded that determinations made under
the slayer statute should turn on the mental state or
culpability of the slayer, or the punitive value of the
statute.247 Thus, Ladd was not held accountable for her
actions. In effect, the court deemed Ladd blameless, while
also allowing her to keep her inheritance rights.248
While it is uncertain whether the result in Estate of Ladd
would change under the current rules, the analysis would
Courts today address mentally ill
surely be different.
offenders under the framework of M'Naghten as opposed to
the ALI test, which was in place at the time Estate of Ladd
was decided. Estate of Ladd accurately reflects its place in
240. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (8th ed. 2004).

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Denno, supra note 238, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
See Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 894.
See id.
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time; a timepiece case that represents the clash between law
and psychiatry. As a guide for statutory analysis, however,
the decision falls short.
In switching the California insanity test to M'Naghten,
the California Legislature attempted to calm public outcry
and fetter out defendants' unwarranted, yet successful,
employment of the defense. 249 The M'Naghten rule is an
important principle of law.
Accordingly, the California
Legislature should provide for insanity in the slayer statute
within the Probate Code, and employ this standard in
another, more recent and reflective, appellate review.25 ° To
do otherwise would lead to an inequitable result under a
principle founded in equity.
C. The CaliforniaLegal System Has Inadequate Guidelines
to Determine How to DistributeProperty to Mentally Ill
Slayers
Law and psychiatry are inherently conflicted.2 1 When
law demands the use of psychiatry, there is friction; thus,
when the law can function without psychiatry, it will.2" 2 This
phenomenon is evident in the California slayer statute.25 3
Curiously, it would seem necessary to include a provision for
the mentally ill within the slayer statute.
While there
certainly are some greedy heirs who are only mentally
unhealthy in that they cannot wait for their birthrights, there
are also those who kill because they must, commanded by a
force beyond their control.
1.

The Conflict Between Law and Psychiatry

Court decisions regarding the culpability of a mentally ill
defendant suggest the social conflicts that dominate insanity
defense jurisprudence.2 54 Estate of Ladd narrowly construes
California's statute to include only a select group of killers,
leaving the insane as a class beyond the confines of the
statute.2 5 5 While this result is subject to scrutiny, it reflects

249. Gordon, supra note 120, at 89-90.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See discussion infra Part V.
See generally PERLIN, supra note 136.
Id. at 195.
See supra Part III.
See PERLIN, supra note 136, at 227.
See Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893-94 (Ct. App. 1979).
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the hesitation the law has in punishing mentally ill
defendants .26
The conflict between law and psychiatry is rooted in the
assumptions of each field.257 The law assumes the existence
of a reasonable man; this reasonable man is the standard the
law uses to judge human behavior.2 58 Psychiatry, on the
other hand, deals with the unreasonable man.2 59 In insanity
defense jurisprudence, "the two professions become uniquely
intermingled."2 60 Therefore, the law must decide how to treat
261
the "unreasonable" man.
The legal system's ambivalence toward psychiatry has
spawned a series of tensions that only serve to further our
doctrinal incoherence.26 2 While there may be an inherent
conflict between these two fields, psychiatry serves an
important role within the judicial process.2 63 The law uses
psychiatry "to explain 'inexplicable' deviant behavior and to
'take the weight' in decisions about an individual defendant's
responsibility, competency, or dangerousness."26
Legal action regarding the punishment of mentally ill
individuals charged with crimes has always reflected a
special ambivalence. 265 The writings of physicians, lawyers,
judges, and others faced with this issue contain a remarkable
amount of circular reasoning.26 6 This uncertainty about how
much we should rely on psychiatry, for what purposes, and
with what legal consequences leads to both "pretextual and
teleological decision making."267 Where psychiatry supports
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra Part II.E.1.
See Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 91, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PERLIN, supra note 136, at 227.
See id. at 194.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 188.

266. JUSTINE WISE POLIER, THE
PSYCHIATRY 13 (1968).

RULE

OF

LAW AND THE

ROLE

OF

267. PERLIN, supra note 136, at 195. Psychiatric expertise is valued when it
serves a social control function of the law (such as in testifying in involuntary
civil commitment proceedings in support of commitment applications), but it is
devalued when it appears to subvert that purpose (for example, as in testimony
in insanity defense cases supporting a defendant's non-responsibility claim). J.
LA FOND & M. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL
HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 156 (1992).
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other instrumental social goals, it receives great credence.2 68
Yet where it is contrary to such goals, we suppress it. 269 This
hesitation deserves greater attention, especially in previously
overlooked areas of law such as rules pertaining to slayers.2 70
2.

The Lack of an Express Accommodation in
California'sSlayer Statutes for the Mentally Ill

Through California's slayer statutes, the California
Legislature expressed a sweeping policy against allowing a
felonious and intentional killer to receive any form of benefit
from his killing. 71 1 It is not obvious, however, how these
statutes should be applied to the mentally ill.272 Absent an
explicit indication from the Legislature stating otherwise,
little supports the assumption that insane slayers should
inherit.2 73
The lack of a provision for mentally ill offenders in the
California slayer statute proves that, for once, the state is
behind the times.27 4 California, "a bellwether state in terms
of cultural, political, and social trends," has taken steps that
demonstrate a regression to nineteenth century standards
towards treating the mentally ill.275
California has
demonstrated an effort to severely restrict mental defenses.2 76
As the insanity defense slowly regresses, the stricter legal
standards make it even clearer that when an individual
meets the insanity criterion, the state should provide for his
behavior by statute.2 77 Society cannot resort to the circular
and ambivalent reasoning of the judicial system to decide this
268. PERLIN, supra note 136, at 195.
269. Id. Justice Thomas's opinion in Foucha v. Louisiana, in which he
dissents from an opinion declaring unconstitutional a state law allowing the
continued commitment of "not guilty by reason of insanity" acquittees who are
no longer mentally ill, is a textbook example of this sort of judicial behavior.
504 U.S. 71 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas based much of his
conclusion that such retention is constitutionally permissible on a variety of
sources, including the 1962 commentary to the Model Penal Code, a 1933 text
by Henry Weihofen, and a 1956 Supreme Court opinion that stressed
psychiatry's uncertainty of diagnosis. Id.
270. See discussion infra Part V.
271. CAL. PROB. CODE § 254 (West 2006).
272. See supra Part II.F.
273. See discussion supra Part V.A.
274. See discussion infra Part V for a solution to this problem.
275. Gordon, supra note 120, at 75.
276. Id.
277. See discussion infra Part V.
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issue. 278
Indiana and Ohio provide for the insane slayer in their
respective laws, and are therefore ahead of California in this
regard. In response to their indignation over the outcome of a
1983 slayer case,279 the Indiana Legislature enacted a statute
declaring a person found guilty but mentally ill to be a
constructive trustee of any property that he acquired from the
victim. 28 0 As constructive trustee, the slayer holds the
property for the people who would have been entitled to the
property as if the slayer had died immediately before the
281
victim.
The Ohio Legislature amended the Ohio slayer statute so
that a slayer found not guilty by reason of insanity suffers the
immediate loss of benefits from the victim's estate.2 82 The
slayer may file a complaint to have his or her right to inherit
restored, but this will not be granted if the civil court
determines that, if sane, the slayer would have been
convicted in a criminal trial.283 The civil court has the power
to determine whether the insanity judgment in the criminal
trial will be dispositive of a restoration of the right to
inherit.2 84
Indiana and Ohio amended their slayer statutes to
include the following in their definition of slayer-a person
who was insane at the time of the killing or incompetent to
stand trial. 28 1 These changes demonstrate that the ambiguity
between law and psychiatry might finally find resolution in
the area of inheritance and testamentary disposition.28 6
Indiana and Ohio have set an example that other states, such
as California, should note. The inadequacies of the California
rule do not have to persist; by following Ohio and Indiana's
lead, California can resolve its flawed and incomplete rule.

278. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
279. See Turner v. Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(where a son who killed both of his parents, but was found innocent by reason of
insanity, was entitled to his intestate share of his parents' estates and his share
of the insurance proceeds).
280. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (LexisNexis 1986).
281. Id.
282. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (LexisNexis 1985).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Fellows, supra note 76, at 555 n.26.
286. See generally PERLIN, supra note 136.
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V. SECTION 250 OF THE CALIFORNIA PROBATE CODE MUST BE
AMENDED TO EXPLICITLY PROVIDE FOR INSANE SLAYERS

The conclusion under Estate of Ladd renders the insane
slayer criminally blameless and strangely compensated for
his or her misdeed. While California usually leads the way in
innovative social legislation, other jurisdictions have taken
the lead in this area of law by producing new, unambiguous
rules for insane slayers.2 7 California should follow the
initiative shown by the Indiana and Ohio Legislatures and
expressly address the predicament posed by the "insane
slayer" by amending the Probate Code.
The California Legislature must amend section 250 of the
Probate Code to include a provision that explicitly alleviates
any ambiguity regarding the proper treatment of the
mentally ill slayer. "The clearer and more definitive our
distribution-codified law is, the more effectively we will be
able to protect [the non-slayer's] rights to inherit what is
288
rightfully theirs to take."
Specifically, the mentally ill should be included within
the classification of people that cannot take under the victim's
estate. A killer who has been adjudicated incompetent to
stand trial, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, should
289
be declared a constructive trustee of their victim's property.
Turning the slayer into the constructive trustee,29 ° instead of
the property holder, is proper. The slayer acquired the
property in circumstances such that he cannot retain the
beneficial interest in good conscience; equity should therefore
convert him into a trustee.29 '
The use of a constructive trust is ideal because it
preserves the principles of equity that underlie the slayer
rules, while also ensuring against unjust enrichment. It is
appropriate to release slayers from criminal culpability on
account of their mental state, but they should not be allowed
to benefit from their actions in the civil courts.

287. See Fellows, supra note 76, at 555 n.26; Gordon, supra note 120, at 75.
288. Kramer, supra note 50, at 721.
289. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (LexisNexis 1986).
290. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1547 (8th ed. 2004) (citing Beatty v.
Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919)). "A constructive
trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression."
Id.
291. Id.
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While the statute proposed for California by this
comment would draw guidance from the statutes of Indiana
and Ohio, it would nonetheless be different. Ohio allows the
insane slayer to file a complaint to declare his right to benefit
from the death in the probate court.292 California should not
adopt this provision. The slayer killed the decedent, and
should not be allowed to benefit as a result. "It is repugnant
to decency to say that an insane murderer can finance her
rehabilitation with new found wealth from her victim's
estate."2 93 Consequently, this provision is unnecessary and
would be a waste of judicial resources.
Indiana requires a civil action to be filed declaring the
insane slayer a constructive trustee.29 4 In California, once the
slayer has been adjudged insane, he should automatically
become the constructive trustee of the property. To require
otherwise is, again, unnecessary. The proposed addition
would alleviate judicial uncertainty regarding the rights
of
295
the insane, and provide a clear rule for courts to follow.
If Estate of Ladd had been decided under the proposed
statutory guidelines, the result would have been quite
different. The court would not have allowed Gloria Ladd to
inherit. Instead, based upon the court finding her insane, she
would have been named a constructive trustee.
VI. CONCLUSION

The ambivalent feelings that dominate insanity defense
jurisprudence have spawned a series of tensions that
contributed substantially to our doctrinal incoherence. The
legislative debate following the Hinckley acquittal reflected
the way these tensions animated legislative change, change
that returned the insanity standard to its restrictive version.
The impact of the doctrinal incoherence persists in
California's slayer statute. Without legislative intervention
to resolve the ambiguity, the issue of whether an "insane
slayer" should inherit from his victim's estate is unlikely to
disappear.29 6 The proposed statutory solution set forth above

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (LexisNexis 1985).
Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 407 (Cole, J., dissenting).
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (LexisNexis 1986).
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part V.
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amends the inadequacies of the current statute, while
providing for the principles and policies of the original rule.2 97
In the absence of a definitive codified rule, California courts
will continue to struggle with the issue. 29 They will base
their findings on outdated precedent, decide against what is
perhaps the true desire of the Legislature, and violate the
principles and policies underlying the slayer rule.2 99

297. See discussion supra Part V.
298. See supra Part III.
299. See discussion supra Part IV.

